The purpose of this paper is to provide a critical review of the existing studies in the literature regarding real earnings management and corporate governance. The paper also addresses the gap in the real earnings management literature in the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) as a major market in the Middle East and proposes future research topics.
second reason is to increase valuations and avoid negative regulatory and contracting consequences (Graham et al. 2005) .
There are two possible ways to manage earnings: accruals management and real activities management (Gunny, 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008) .
Accrual-based earnings management was extensively discussed in the literature (Schipper 1989; Healy and Wahlen 1999; Fields et al. 2001 ). However, real activities management as an earnings management tool was not well understood until recent years. Therefore, relatively few studies in the accounting literature investigated the management of real transactions to distort earnings. Graham et al. (2005) surveyed 401 executives. The results revealed that around 78% of executives prefer managing real activities over accrual-based earnings management to achieve their financial reporting objectives.
It is assumed that firms have different incentives to engage in real earnings management rather than accrual-based earnings management. Many studies showed that managers prefer to manage real business operations to meet earnings benchmarks (Baber et al. 1991; Bartov 1993; Roychowdhury 2006) . Moreover, Chi et al. (2011) added that firms tend to engage in real activities management when their ability to manage accruals is limited by higher quality auditors. Besides, it is assumed that it is riskier to manage accrual-based earnings because it would easily draw regulatory investigations and auditor litigations. On the other side, stakeholders of a firm will find it difficult to investigate real activity management. This is supported by Kuo et al. (2014) who noted that Chinese firms have shifted from accruals management to real earnings management because it is less detectable. Furthermore, firms have many flexible options to manage with different activities (e.g. investing, operating, and financing activities).
However, firms have limited options to manage accruals by altering accounting choices.
Besides, managers can alter reported earnings at any time during the year at their convenience, whereas, accrual earnings management normally takes place as an expost form. A study by Ge and Kim (2014) showed that firms prefer to engage in real earnings management in the year of issuing their new bond to mislead rating agencies and accordingly have a lower bond yield spread. Based on what was mentioned above, the recent literature has focused on the investigations on real earnings management.
Previous studies had used different techniques to measure real earnings management (REM). Based on (Berger 1993; Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen et al. 2008; Zarowin 2010; Zang 2012; Ge and Kim 2014) studies, they used four proxies to measure real earnings management: abnormal cash flow from operations as a proxy for sales management, abnormal production cost as a proxy for overproduction, the abnormal reduction of R&D expenses, and the abnormal reduction of discretionary expenses (other than R&D). Also, there are other methods used in prior studies to measure the level of real earnings management. Graham et al. (2004) stated that CFOs confessed cutting or delaying maintenance expenses and the travel budget. They further mentioned that they tend to postpone or eliminate capital investments to avoid depreciation charges, and they manage the funding of pension plans.
On the other hand, real earnings management would raise many concerns in the long term period. Gunny (2005) study analysis illustrated that real earnings management activities (sales management, sale of fixed assets, R&D expenses reduction) have an economically significant negative impact on future operating performance. Besides, Eldenburg et al. (2011) found that firms with stronger performance incentives exhibit a significant incremental decrease in real expenditures in the future.
Real earnings management has remained a largely unexplored area in the literature. Moreover, managing real activities is less costly to managers than firms and stakeholders (Gunny, 2005 (Gunny, & 2010 .
The recent collapse of some large companies resulting partially from accounting manipulation has raised serious questions about the role of different monitoring devices presumed to protect investors' interests and control managerial opportunistic behavior.
Based on prior studies, corporate governance is considered one of the most effective monitoring devices. One of the most important monitoring devices is corporate governance. Investors and financial communities expressed concern about the reliability and the quality of reported earnings and the effectiveness of corporate governance systems. Companies started to pay a lot of attention to the need to achieve significant progress to corporate governance perform to assure investors' confidence in financial reporting quality. Davis (2005) had defined corporate governance as the processes, structures, and institutions within and around organizations that assign resource and power control among the participants.
Earnings management practices would result in producing a low quality of reported earnings that do not reflect a firm's real financial performance. And accordingly, it reduces the investors' confidence in the financial reports. Therefore, companies use different monitoring systems to eliminate managers' opportunistic behavior to increase the transparency and reliability of financial reports. Based on prior literature, it is widely accepted that corporate governance mechanisms can limit a manager's ability to Board of directors plays an essential role in corporate governance as it is the center of control systems and decision-making (Fama & Jensen, 1983 ). Fama (1980) mentioned that the board is considered one of the most significant corporate governance tools to monitor the managers' actions. Besides, the board contributes to mitigating the managerial self-serving behavior risk and as a result, enhancing firm value by lowering the agency costs (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) .
The most effective monitoring tool used in corporate governance mechanisms is the board independence from the management (Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996) . Baysinger & Butler (1985) added that independent board members are expected to afford the greatest service to protect shareholders' interests and to monitor managers. Also, Beasley (1996) noted that the number of independent directors of the board is positively associated with the board's ability to influence the disclosure decisions. The researcher justified the lack of relationship between governance mechanisms and management of real activities by stating that real earnings management has limited empirical studies in the literature, therefore, there is a lack of work on detection. He also pointed out the fact that the managing real activities is complicated and accordingly, the establishment of methods for its detection is not an easy task.
A study conducted in the UK by Osma (2008) Act period. The study findings revealed that the level of real earnings management is higher when a firm is faced with tough board monitoring, and that takeover protection may reduce managerial incentives for real earnings management.
Future Studies
Based on previous studies, accrual-based earnings management appears to be decreasing because managers realized that the risks and costs of accrual-based management to be higher than its benefits in a heightened regulatory environment.
Besides, accruals mangement has been extensively studied in previous literature (e.g., 
